The dedifferentiation problem / Pierre Schlag.
This article demonstrates that our more sophisticated theories of law lead us to a point where we are no longer able to distinguish law from culture, or society, or the market, or politics or anything of the sort. Not only are the various terms inextricably intertwined (something that other thinkers...
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Other title: | Continental philosophy review. Colorado Law faculty scholarship collection. |
Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Dordrecht ; Boston :
Kluwer Academic,
2009.
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Series: | Continental philosophy review ;
v. 42, no. 1 (February 2009) |
Subjects: |
Summary: | This article demonstrates that our more sophisticated theories of law lead us to a point where we are no longer able to distinguish law from culture, or society, or the market, or politics or anything of the sort. Not only are the various terms inextricably intertwined (something that other thinkers have observed) but we are no longer in a position to articulate any relations between these various terms at all. It is with this latter realization that the dedifferentiation problem kicks in. Because the various terms cannot be disentangled, we find ourselves in the odd position where there is nothing of any positive character to be said about their relations. Each is already the other and, thus, they can have no relation. This is rather bad news for the ways in which we have traditionally conceived theories of law—indeed any theory that gets off the ground by distinguishing law from a discrete something else (which, on first glance, would seem to include all legal theory). |
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Item Description: | Article contained in the Vol. 42, no. 1 (February 2009) issue of Continental philosophy review. |
Physical Description: | Article on p. 35-62. |