Financial sector inefficiencies and the debt Laffer curve [electronic resource] / Pierre-Richard Agénor and Joshua Aizenman.

Agénor and Aizenman analyze the implications of inefficient financial intermediation for debt management using a model in which firms rely on bank credit to finance their working capital needs and lenders face high state verification and enforcement costs of loan contracts. Their analysis shows tha...

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Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via Open Knowledge Repository)
Main Author: Agénor, Pierre-Richard
Corporate Authors: World Bank, World Bank Institute. Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction
Other Authors: Aizenman, Joshua
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : World Bank, World Bank Institute, Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction Division, [2002]
Series:Policy research working papers ; no. 2842.
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Summary:Agénor and Aizenman analyze the implications of inefficient financial intermediation for debt management using a model in which firms rely on bank credit to finance their working capital needs and lenders face high state verification and enforcement costs of loan contracts. Their analysis shows that lower expected productivity, higher contract enforcement and verification costs, or higher volatility of productivity shocks may shift the economy to the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve, with potentially sizable output and welfare losses. The main implication of this analysis is that debt relief may generate little welfare gains unless it is accompanied by reforms aimed at reducing financial sector inefficiencies. This paper--a product of the Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction Division, World Bank Institute--is part of a larger effort in the institute to understand the macroeconomic effects of financial sector inefficiencies. Pierre-Richard Agénor may be contacted at pagenor@worldbank.org.
Physical Description:1 online resource (22 pages) : illustrations.
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 21-22).