Redrafting constitutions in democratic regimes : theoretical and comparative perspectives / edited by Gabriel L. Negretto.
Growing public discontent with the performance and quality of many contemporary democracies makes them vulnerable to popular pressures to profoundly transform or replace their constitutions. However, there is little systematic academic discussion on the legal and political challenges that these even...
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2020.
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| Series: | Comparative constitutional law and policy.
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Table of Contents:
- Cover
- Half-title
- Series information
- Title page
- Copyright information
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 New Constitutions in Democratic Regimes
- I Constitutional Replacements under Democratic Institutions
- II Procedural and Political Features
- III Constitutional Replacements, Democracy, and Constitutionalism
- References
- Part I Conceptual, Normative, and Empirical Issues
- 2 Constitution Making through Law
- I Rousseau and Sieyès on the Creation of New Constitutions
- II Two Approaches to Constituent Power
- III The Constitutionalization of Constituent Power
- IV The Legal Replacement of Constitutional Regimes
- V Conclusion
- References
- 3 Expanding Revision Clauses in Democratic Constitutions
- I Competing Demands of Democratic Constitution Making
- I.A The Status Quo Problem
- I.B The Factional Problem
- I.C Solutions to These Problems?
- II The Legal Rules and Roles of Constitution-Making Institutions
- II. A The Law of Constitution Making
- II. B Roles of Constitution Making: Drafting and Ratification
- III Drafting Institutions
- III. A Ordinary Institutions: Appointed Commissions
- III. B Ordinary Institutions: Legislative Amendment and Dual-Purpose, Constituent Legislatures
- III. C Extraordinary Institutions: Constituent Assemblies
- IV Ratification Institutions
- IV. A Ordinary Politics: Legislative Ratification
- IV. B Extraordinary Politics: Constitutional Referendums
- V Expanded Revision Clauses
- V.A Nature of Regulation
- V.B Expanded Revision Clauses
- VI Conclusion
- References
- 4 Courts and Constitution Making in Democratic Regimes: A Contextual Approach
- I The Context of Constitutional Replacement in Democracies and the Activation of Courts
- II A Typology of Judicial Functions during Constitution Making
- III Constituent Power Theory and the Catalytic Function
- IV ''Legalist'' Interventions and the Blocking Function
- V Sub-Constitutional Modes of Intervention and the Shaping Function
- VI Conclusion
- References
- 5 Replacing Constitutions in Democratic Regimes: Elite Cooperation and Citizen Participation
- I Citizens, Elites, and Democracy in Constitution-Making Theory
- II Aggregate Statistical Analysis
- II. A The Liberal Dimension of Democracy
- II. B Elite Cooperation and Citizen Participation in Constitution Making
- II. C Results
- III Qualitative Evidence: Kenya 2010 and Bolivia 2009
- IV Conclusion
- References
- Part II Case Studies
- 6 The Difference Power Diffusion Makes: Explaining Divergent Outcomes in Colombia (1990-1991) and Venezuela (1998-1999)
- I Constitution Drafting As a Political Process
- II Linking Processes and Outcomes
- III Colombia: The Making of the 1991 Constitution
- III. A Inside the Assembly
- III. B Constitutional Outcomes
- IV Venezuela: The Making of the 1999 Constitution
- IV. A Inside the Assembly
- IV. B Constitutional Outcomes
- V Conclusion
- References