The logic of financial nationalism : the challenges of cooperation and the role of international law / Federico Lupo-Pasini.

Using case studies ranging from cross-border bank resolution to sovereign debt, the author analyzes the role of international law in protecting financial sovereignty, and the risks for the global financial system posed by the lack of international cooperation. Despite the post-crisis reforms, the gl...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via Cambridge)
Main Author: Lupo-Pasini, Federico (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Subjects:

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000 i 4500
001 in00000058120
006 m o d
007 cr |||||||||||
008 170915s2017 enk ob 001 0 eng d
005 20230831181042.0
035 |a (OCoLC)ceba1003854874 
037 |a ceba9781316986950 
040 |a N$T  |b eng  |e rda  |e pn  |c N$T  |d N$T  |d OCLCF  |d YDX  |d LGG  |d IDEBK  |d OTZ  |d EBLCP  |d FIE  |d OCLCQ  |d U3W  |d INT  |d OCLCQ  |d OCL  |d LUN  |d MM9  |d K6U  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d SFB  |d OCLCQ  |d INARC 
019 |a 1003492596  |a 1006095803  |a 1167110526  |a 1173880973 
020 |a 9781108104975  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 1108104975  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 9781316986950 
020 |a 1316986950 
020 |a 1108104576 
020 |a 9781108104579 
020 |a 9781316638767  |q (paperback) 
020 |a 1316638766 
020 |z 9781107189027 
020 |z 1107189020 
029 1 |a CHNEW  |b 000975262 
035 |a (OCoLC)1003854874  |z (OCoLC)1003492596  |z (OCoLC)1006095803  |z (OCoLC)1167110526  |z (OCoLC)1173880973 
043 |a e------ 
050 4 |a K4430  |b .L87 2017 
084 |a LAW007000  |2 bisacsh 
049 |a GWRE 
100 1 |a Lupo-Pasini, Federico,  |e author. 
245 1 4 |a The logic of financial nationalism :  |b the challenges of cooperation and the role of international law /  |c Federico Lupo-Pasini. 
264 1 |a Cambridge, United Kingdom ;  |a New York, NY :  |b Cambridge University Press,  |c 2017. 
264 4 |c ©2017 
300 |a 1 online resource 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
588 0 |a Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed September 26, 2017). 
520 |a Using case studies ranging from cross-border bank resolution to sovereign debt, the author analyzes the role of international law in protecting financial sovereignty, and the risks for the global financial system posed by the lack of international cooperation. Despite the post-crisis reforms, the global financial system is still mainly based on a logic of financial nationalism. International financial law plays a major role in this regard as it still focuses more on the protection of national interests rather than the promotion of global objectives. This is an inefficient approach because it encourages bad domestic governance and reduces capital mobility. In this analysis, Lupo-Pasini discusses some of the alternatives (such as the European Banking Union, Regulatory Passports, and international financial courts), and offers a new vision for the role of international law in maintaining and fostering global financial stability. In doing so, he fills a void in the law and economics literature, and puts forward a solution to tackle the problems of international cooperation in finance based on the use of international law. 
505 0 |a Cover -- Half Title -- Title page -- Imprints page -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Financial Integration and Instability -- 1 The Logic of Externalities -- 1.1. An Interconnected Financial System -- 1.1.1. A Typical Bank Balance Sheet -- 1.1.2. Financial Infrastructures -- 1.2. Systemic Risk -- 1.3. The Logic of Externalities -- 1.3.1. Firmsâ#x80;#x99; Behaviors -- 1.3.2. Negative Externalities -- 1.3.3. Externalities and the Law -- 1.3.4. Prudential Regulations -- 1.4. Financial Stability and the State 
505 8 |a 1.4.1. Choice of Players1.4.2. Distribution of Losses -- 1.4.3. Contractual Rights and Legal Protection -- 2 Nationalism and Cooperation in International Finance -- 2.1. Financial Integration and Global Systemic Risk -- 2.2. Global Financial Stability in a World of Sovereign States -- 2.2.1. The National Interest -- 2.2.2. Principalâ#x80;#x93;Agent Model in an International Setting -- 2.3. Coordination Problems -- 2.4. Externalities and the Role of International Law -- 2.5. The Logic of Financial Nationalism -- 2.5.1. Financial Nationalism in International Law 
505 8 |a 2.5.2. Financial Nationalism as a Negative Externality2.6. When International Law Works -- 3 The Perils of Home-Country Control -- 3.1. Homeâ#x80;#x93;Host Supervisory Cooperation in International Law -- 3.1.1. The Beginnings: The 1975 Concordat and Host Country Dominance -- 3.1.2. The Rise of Home-Country Control in Banking Supervision -- 3.2. The Evolution of the Home-Country Model in Europe -- 3.3. Home-Country Model and Financial Integration -- 3.4. The Logic of Financial Nationalism in Home-Country Failures -- 3.4.1. Principalâ#x80;#x93;Agent Problems 
505 8 |a 3.4.2. The Lack of Accountability3.5. The Icesave Dispute -- 3.6. Concluding Remarks -- 4 Cross-Border Banking -- 4.1. Crisis Resolution Policies in International Law -- 4.1.1. The Policy of Financial Crises -- 4.1.2. The Challenges of an International Legal Regime -- 4.2. Regulatory Asymmetries in Bank Insolvency Regimes -- 4.2.1. Regulatory Asymmetries in Bank Insolvency Regimes -- 4.2.2. Ring-Fencing and â#x80;#x9C;Stability Warsâ#x80;#x9D; -- 4.3. The Bailout Game -- 4.3.1. The Economics of International Bailouts -- 4.3.2. The Resolution of Fortis Bank 
505 8 |a 4.4. Challenges in International Bail-ins4.5. The FSBâ#x80;#x99;s Standards on International Cooperation -- 4.5.1. The FSB Principles for Cross-Border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions -- 4.5.2. Challenges Ahead -- 5 Nationalism in Sovereign Debt -- 5.1. The Political Economy of Sovereign Borrowing and Defaults -- 5.2. Fiscal Sovereignty and Moral Hazard -- 5.3. The Economics of Financial Necessity -- 5.4. Financial Nationalism in Sovereign Debt Restructurings -- 5.5. Which Solutions? Private Mechanisms v. International Law 
650 0 |a International finance  |x Law and legislation. 
650 0 |a Debts, Public  |x Law and legislation. 
650 0 |a Capital movements  |x Law and legislation. 
650 0 |a Foreign exchange  |x Law and legislation. 
650 0 |a Banking law  |z European Union countries. 
650 0 |a Economic stabilization. 
650 7 |a Banking law.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00826811 
650 7 |a Capital movements  |x Law and legislation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00846379 
650 7 |a Debts, Public  |x Law and legislation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00888866 
650 7 |a Economic stabilization.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00902085 
650 7 |a Foreign exchange  |x Law and legislation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00931783 
650 7 |a International finance  |x Law and legislation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00976955 
651 7 |a European Union countries.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01269470 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Lupo-Pasini, Federico.  |t Logic of financial nationalism.  |d Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017  |z 9781107189027  |z 1107189020  |w (DLC) 2017024647  |w (OCoLC)982092236 
856 4 0 |u https://colorado.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316986950  |z Full Text (via Cambridge) 
915 |a - 
956 |a Cambridge EBA 
956 |b Cambridge EBA ebooks Complete Collection 
998 |b New collection CUP.ebaebookscomplete 
994 |a 92  |b COD 
999 f f |s cb1846cf-e27b-4083-b9a0-428a76ea595e  |i 60c82d40-39fa-4180-92a9-81916964befc 
952 f f |p Can circulate  |a University of Colorado Boulder  |b Online  |c Online  |d Online  |h Library of Congress classification  |i web