Responsibility : the epistemic condition /

Responsibility : the epistemic condition / edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland.

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Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough,...

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Wieland, Jan Willem (Editor), Robichaud, Philip (Editor)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.
Edition:First edition.
Subjects:
Responsibility.
Virtue epistemology.
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Unwitting Wrongdoing, Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness / William J. FitPatrick
  • 2. Akrasia, Awareness, and Blameworthiness / Matthew Talbert
  • 3. When Ignorance is No Excuse / Clayton Littlejohn
  • 4. Vice, Blameworthiness, and Cultural Ignorance / Alan T. Wilson
  • 5. Blame and Moral Ignorance / George Sher
  • 6. When is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory? / Elizabeth Harman
  • 7. On Knowing What's Right and Being Responsible for It / Paulina Sliwa
  • 8. Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility / Gunnar Bjornsson
  • 9. The Epistemic Condition on Moral Blameworthiness: A Theoretical Epiphenomenon / Peter A. Graham
  • 10. Hard to Know / Gwen Bradford
  • 11. Intellectual Difficulty and Moral Responsibility / Alexander A. Guerrero
  • 12. Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will / Michael J. Zimmerman
  • 13. Ignorance, Revision, and Commonsense / Randolph Clarke
  • 14. Methodological Conservatism and the Epistemic Condition / Neil Levy
  • 15. Tracing the Epistemic Condition / Matt King
  • 16. Blame Transfer / Philip Robichaud.

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