Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2015, held in London, UK, in November 2015. The 16 revised full papers presented together with 5 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions....
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Full Text (via Springer) |
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| Other Authors: | , , |
| Other title: | GameSec 2015. |
| Format: | Conference Proceeding eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cham :
Springer,
2015.
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| Series: | Lecture notes in computer science ;
9406. LNCS sublibrary. Security and cryptology. |
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Table of Contents:
- Intro; Preface; Organization; Contents; Full Papers; A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber Defense; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Preliminaries; 3.1 Virtual Network Model; 3.2 Adversary Model; 4 Modeling Interaction with Single Decoy; 4.1 Timing-Based Decoy Detection Game; 4.2 Fingerprinting-Based Decoy Detection Game; 5 Characterization of Optimal IP Address Randomization Strategy by Network; 5.1 Game Formulation; 5.2 Optimal Strategy of the System; 5.3 Optimal Strategy of the Adversary; 6 Simulation Study; 7 Conclusion; References.
- Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks1 Introduction; 1.1 Related Works; 1.2 Organization of the Paper; 2 Game-Theoretic Model for Cyber Insurance; 3 Analysis of the Cyber Insurance Model; 3.1 Separable Utilities; 3.2 Case Study: Cyber Insurance Under Infection Dynamics; 4 Conclusion; References; Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Background: Network Security Games; 3 Related Work; 4 Adversary Behavioral Models; 4.1 The Perfectly Rational Model; 4.2 The Quantal Response Model.
- 4.3 The Subjective Utility Quantal Response Model4.4 The SUQR Graph-Aware Model; 5 Defender Strategy Generation; 6 Human Subject Experiments; 6.1 Experimental Overview; 6.2 Experiment Data Composition; 6.3 Data Analysis Metrics; 7 Predictive Reliability Analysis; 7.1 SSG Experiment; 7.2 SSG Predictive Reliability; 7.3 NSG Predictive Reliability; 7.4 Training Set Size; 8 Predictive Reliability Factors; 8.1 Training Set Feature: EAS; 9 Graph Features and Their Impacts on Predictive Reliability; 10 Conclusion; References; Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments; 1 Introduction.
- 2 Related Work2.1 Security Economics and Games of Timing; 2.2 Theoretical Analyses of FlipIt; 2.3 Behavioral Studies of FlipIt; 3 Model; 3.1 Players and Choices; 3.2 Environment; 3.3 Consequences; 4 Analysis; 5 Numerical Examples; 6 Conclusion; References; Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Prior Work; 2 The Multi-party FlipIt Model; 3 Obtaining Nash Equilibria in Continuous Time for a Stochastic Process; 3.1 Simple Example, FlipThem0F(n, n, d,): Full Threshold, Full Reset; 3.2 FlipThemF(n, t, d,): (n, t)-Threshold, Full Reset.
- 3.3 FlipThemS(n, t, d,): (n, t)-Threshold, Single ResetReferences; A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources; 1 Introduction; 2 Game Model; 2.1 Basic Model; 2.2 Defender's Problem; 2.3 Attacker's Problem; 3 Best Responses; 3.1 Defender's Best Response; 3.2 Attacker's Best Response; 3.3 Simplified Optimization Problems; 4 Nash Equilibria; 5 Sequential Game; 6 Numerical Result; 7 Conclusion; References; Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Game Formulation.