Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? / Daniel Kaufmann, Shang-Jin Wei.

In a general equilibrium in which bribe-extracting bureaucrats can endogenously choose regulatory burden and delay, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery can be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm surveys, this paper finds evidence consistent with...

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Online Access: Full Text (via IMF e-Library)
Main Author: Kaufmann, Daniel
Other Authors: Wei, Shang-Jin
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000.
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/2000/064.
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