Having it both ways : hybrid theories and modern metaethics / Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge.

A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-lik...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via Oxford Scholarship Online)
Other Authors: Fletcher, Guy, 1983- (Editor), Ridge, Michael (Michael R.) (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Series:Oxford moral theory.
Subjects:

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a2200000ui 4500
001 b7855081
003 CoU
005 20140930103016.0
006 m o d
007 cr |||||||||||
008 140924s2014 nyu fo| 001 0|eng|d
020 |a 9780199347605 (ebook) 
035 |a (StDuBDS)edz0000898663 
040 |a StDuBDS  |c StDuBDS  |e rda  |e pn 
050 0 |a BJ1012  |b .H349 2014 
245 0 0 |a Having it both ways :  |b hybrid theories and modern metaethics /  |c Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge. 
264 1 |a New York :  |b Oxford University Press,  |c 2014. 
300 |a 1 online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent. 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia. 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier. 
490 1 |a Oxford moral theory. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
520 8 |a A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other such views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. These essays examine the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language (focusing mainly but not exclusively on moral thought & talk) 
588 |a Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on September 24, 2014) 
650 0 |a Metaethics.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2011005653. 
700 1 |a Fletcher, Guy,  |d 1983-  |e editor.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2014044484  |1 http://isni.org/isni/0000000436090538. 
700 1 |a Ridge, Michael  |q (Michael R.),  |e editor.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no00004523  |1 http://isni.org/isni/0000000109749163. 
776 0 8 |i Print version  |z 9780199347582. 
830 0 |a Oxford moral theory.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2011154642. 
856 4 0 |u https://colorado.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001  |z Full Text (via Oxford Scholarship Online) 
907 |a .b78550816  |b 03-19-20  |c 12-05-14 
998 |a web  |b 12-05-14  |c b  |d b   |e -  |f eng  |g nyu  |h 0  |i 1 
907 |a .b78550816  |b 12-19-19  |c 12-05-14 
944 |a MARS - RDA ENRICHED 
907 |a .b78550816  |b 12-05-14  |c 12-05-14 
956 |a Oxford Scholarship Online 
999 f f |i d971bde3-a9c9-5d22-9dea-327c4032bced  |s 05126a16-a0a6-53f1-97ea-3446dfdd48a8 
952 f f |p Can circulate  |a University of Colorado Boulder  |b Online  |c Online  |d Online  |e BJ1012 .H349 2014  |h Library of Congress classification  |i web  |n 1