Representational content and the objects of thought [electronic resource] / Nicholas Rimell.
It is commonly held that our beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and that a beliefs truth value (true or false) depends on the truth value of the proposition toward which it is an attitude. From this plausible view Rimell builds a theory of mental representation with two striking features. F...
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| Online Access: |
Full Text (via Springer) |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Singapore :
Palgrave Macmillan,
2021.
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| Subjects: |
| Summary: | It is commonly held that our beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and that a beliefs truth value (true or false) depends on the truth value of the proposition toward which it is an attitude. From this plausible view Rimell builds a theory of mental representation with two striking features. First, our beliefs have private contentcontent that only a single subject can entertain. Second, it is impossible to think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus, the fountain of youth). In light of the latter claim, Rimell offers an error theory meant to explain what we are doing when we think were thinking about nonexistents. To non-specialists, this book serves as a clear, careful introduction to central questions at the intersection of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind: Are thought and meaning entirely in the head? Whats special about first-personal thought and speech? How (if at all) can we think about nonexistents, given that prima facie thinking involves a relation between a subject and an object of thought? To specialists, this book is designed to challenge the standard ways of thinking about these questions and to offer a unified response to them. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9789811635175 981163517X |